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Abstract:  During the ongoing post-communist economic transitions, the
relative well-being of many people is changing rapidly, and governments
are not well positioned to accurately measure individual living standards.
Under such circumstances, continued price controls over basic consumer
goods within the state sector, and the associated queuing, can form a
serviceable device for targeting poor people for subsidies. With a fixed-
price state sector and free-price parallel markets, rich people might
choose to avoid queues and shop in the free markets, while poor people
would prefer to pay low nominal prices and queue in the state sector. The
targeting of subsidies through queues, therefore, can be accomplished
even if the government has no information on individual income or living
standards. When the alternative to price controls is a poorly targeted
explicit social safety net, the resource cost of queues might be more than
compensated for by an improvement in the targeting of subsidies.
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I. Introduction
The provision of an adequate social safety net is a leading concern
during economic transitions from socialism to capitalism. The safety net
in socialist societies consists of explicit provisions such as pensions and
disability payments, as well as other features inherent in the system of
central planning. In particular, the policies of full employment and low
fixed prices for most basic consumer goods within the state sector are
major elements of the social safety net in socialist economies. During the
transition, however, privatization (or the implementation of hard budget
constraints) and price liberalization undermine these implicit social
welfare protections.
1 Transitional economies, therefore, have enacted
additional explicit provisions, such as unemployment benefits and
minimum wages, to protect the welfare of some of their citizens.
A fundamental difficulty in providing benefits to needy individuals
is to distinguish those who are in need from others who can afford to2
provide subsidies. Many programs in the West are means-tested, only
available to those whose incomes fall below some threshold. Such
targeting of benefits is by no means perfect, even in the absence of fraud,
because official income is an imperfect indicator of welfare. The targeting
of social safety provisions is even more problematic in transitional
societies, however. First, the informal economy tends to be very large, so
official income captures a smaller percentage of total monetary income.
2
Second, the in-kind provision of goods and services often is substantial
and variable, diminishing the correlation between monetary income and
welfare. Third, government authorities have little experience with the
implementation and enforcement of the new explicit social welfare
policies. It has been claimed that many of those who receive
unemployment benefits, for example, actually hold jobs.
3
The difficulty of identifying poor people in transitional societies is
matched by its importance. While there are many problems with the data
and their interpretations, the socialist states tended to have distributions
of income that were egalitarian relative to most Western market
economies.
4 During the transitional years, these countries generally have
seen a sharp increase in measured income inequality. The increasing (and
increasingly visible) gap between the haves and have-nots frequently is
cited as leading to an anti-reform backlash, and in promoting the electoral
prospects of former communists or other opponents of transition.3
One policy often advocated by those who are concerned about the
distributional impacts of reform is either to delay price liberalization, or,
after a liberalization, to return to price controls on basic consumer
commodities within the state sector. Western economists typically
lament such policies because of the resource misallocations, including
queuing, that accompany price controls, and because such controls would
seem to slow down the transformation to a market economy.
Price controls, nevertheless, have continued to play a large role in
some transitional economies, and especially in Russia. While most central
price controls were eliminated in Russia in 1992, prices of basic consumer
goods frequently are controlled by local authorities. The EBRD estimated
that one-third of Russian prices remained under control in 1995.
5 The
controls can take the direct form of mandated price ceilings, or the
indirect form of limitations on profit rates. The controls also can be
applied informally, through governmental threats to retaliate in some
manner (perhaps through anti-monopoly provisions) against firms that
charge high prices. Many Russian localities have coupled their price
controls with internal trade restrictions, to prevent the "export" of price-
controlled goods to other Russian regions.
6
Why are price controls so popular in countries that are engaged in a
transition to a market economy? The purpose of this paper is to argue
that queue rationing can be a serviceable device for targeting poor people4
for subsidies, particularly during the reform period, and this feature adds
to the attractiveness of price controls during transition. With a fixed-price
state sector and free-price parallel markets, rich people might choose to
avoid queues and shop in the free markets, while poor people would prefer
to pay low nominal prices and queue in the state sector. The targeting of
subsidies through queues, therefore, can be accomplished even if the
government has no information on individual income or living standards.
When the alternative to price controls is a poorly targeted explicit social
safety net, the resource cost of queues might be more than compensated
for by an improvement in the targeting of subsidies.
A substantial literature has developed on the relative merits of
queuing for distributing goods among heterogeneous consumers. Sah
(1987) shows that poor people prefer queue-rationing to free markets, in a
model with fixed output, no parallel markets, and where everyone, rich
and poor alike, queues for goods under the price-control regime. Alexeev
(1991) and Polterovich (1993) derive similar results in models that also
include general equilibrium effects and free-price, parallel markets.
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Boycko (1992) and Osband (1992), while not primarily concerned with
distributional issues, add production into their models of queue-rationing.
Price controls then carry a further cost in terms of lost output, as waiting
in queues reduces the time available for work. Our model focuses on the
distributional consequences of price controls, but also incorporates a5
production cost to queuing. This cost is muted, however, by the fact that
only the least productive workers stand in line for goods, while more
productive workers purchase goods in the parallel markets.
Berkowitz (1996) is an earlier paper that addresses the question of
the persistence of queue rationing during reform. His model considers a
capacity-constrained market with both state and private firms, where the
local government values consumer surplus more highly than producer
surplus. He shows that in situations where capacity constraints in private
firms lead to high prices, the local government should set a low price in
the state sector and induce queue-rationing. In a sense, such a policy is
an efficient indirect regulatory tool, inducing the private firms to lower
their prices. Our model complements Berkowitz (1996) by considering
situations where the government values a relatively equal distribution of
economic welfare, again finding that state-sector price controls can form
an optimal second-best policy.
8
The generalization of the argument in this paper is simply that
initial conditions are very important for transitional socialist economies.
Explicit social safety nets that do not include price controls are perhaps
the preferable means for protecting social welfare in Western market
economies--though even in these settings, the targeting of subsidies can
be improved by using indirect means, such as workfare.
9 When starting
from a situation of state socialism, however, continuing price controls6
can play a significant role during the transition. Likewise, continued state
ownership of some enterprises might also form part of a safety net during
the transition, even if the desired final destination involves near-
complete privatization.
10 There are many substitute means available to
provide a social safety net. The preferred alternative in transitional
socialist societies may well be quite different from that appropriate for
advanced market economies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents an illustrative model of three different allocation mechanisms:
free markets, queue rationing and parallel markets, and imperfectly
targeted subsidies to poor people. Section 3 compares social welfare under
these regimes through graphical and numerical analysis, while section 4
extends the analysis to a combined targeting-price control scheme.
Section 5 contains a brief discussion and conclusions.
2. An Illustrative Model
There are two types of individuals, rich (denoted by the subscript r)
and poor (denoted by the subscript p). Let the total size of the population
be normalized to 1, with the proportion of poor people denoted by v, and
the proportion of rich people by 1-v. Rich and poor people differ in their
wage rates, assumed to be fixed and exogenous, at wr and wp, respectively.7
Both rich and poor have a total of L hours per period available;
leisure hours are denoted by lr and lp, and hours of work are given by hr
and hp. We will normalize with L=1: hours of work, plus hours of leisure,
plus hours of queuing, sum to 1 for every individual. There is one
consumption good, with the quantities consumed given by xr and xp.
Consumers have a Cobb-Douglas utility in leisure and consumption, with
each component entering with exponent 0.5, given by Ur=lr
½⋅ xr
½ and
Up=lp
½⋅ xp
½.
Assume that workers are paid their marginal product, and that the
production function of the consumption good for both rich and poor
people is linear in hours of labor, with slope equal to marginal product:
poor individuals, who have marginal product wp, produce in total
Qp=v⋅ wp⋅ hp, and the rich, with marginal product wr, produce Qr=(1-v)⋅ wr⋅ hr.
Total output Q, therefore, is Q=v⋅ wp⋅ hp+(1-v)⋅ wr⋅ hr. Time spent queuing,
then, not only directly decreases utility, but also holds the potential to
reduce total output, by detracting from the hours of labor supplied by
workers who wait in line.
The "social planner" is assumed to value both individual welfare and
a relatively egalitarian distribution of living standards. (Alternatively, it
could be assumed that the individuals themselves care about
distribution.) Social welfare, W, will be taken to be encapsulated by a
constant-elasticity-of-substitution function: W =  [vUp
ε +  (1-v)Ur
ε]
1/ε, with8
ε≤ 1.
11 When ε=1, welfare is the sum of individual utilities, and there is no
social gain to redistribution of utility (though redistribution of income
can still influence social welfare.) Lower levels of ε are associated with
higher social concern for distribution; as ε approaches
-∞ , the social welfare function depends only on the utility of the most
worse-off individual (W=min[Up , Ur]). Further, a perfectly equal
distribution of individual utility (Up =  Ur) yields social utility equal to the
sum of individual utilities; for any ε<1, increasing departures from
equality, everything else equal, result in diminishing social welfare.
Case 1: No Intervention
As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the outcome under a free
market, with no price controls or social safety net. The general problem
facing consumers, then, is:
max  Ui = li
½⋅ xi
½   
 li, xi
subject to:  li + hi = 1,  li ≥  0, xi ≥  0, and
P⋅ xi = wi⋅ hi, for i = p, r.
The first constraint reflects the fact that with no queuing under free
markets, people spend all of their time either working or at leisure.
Solving the "no intervention" problem yields li*=1/2, hi*=1/2 and
xi*=wi/2P, for i=p, r.9
At equilibrium, the total quantity demanded equals the total
quantity supplied: vxp* + (1-v)xr* = Q = v⋅ wp⋅ hp*+(1-v)⋅ wr⋅ hr*, and substituting
for hi* and xi* yields a free-market equilibrium price of P*=1. A poor person
achieves utility Up=wp
½/2, and a rich person has utility Ur=wr
½/2.
Case 2: Price Controls
When the social safety net consists of a price-controlled sector,
there exist two channels through which the consumption good can be
secured. In the state sector, the good is sold at a controlled price P', while
in the free-market sector, the price is P. We are interested in the case of a
completely separating equilibrium, where all the poor consumers shop in
the state sector and all of the rich consumers shop in the free markets.
While we assume (see the introduction, and the formalization of a
targeted safety net) that the government cannot identify poor and rich
people ex ante, in the equilibrium with price controls that is examined, ex
post the poor people will be those who are shopping in the state sector.
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A rich person, then, solves the same problem as in the free-market
case, with solutions lr*=1/2, hr*=1/2, and xr*=wr/2P. A poor person shops
only in the state sector, and devotes t hours in queuing per unit of the
good purchased.
13 A poor person therefore solves the problem:
    max  Up = lp
½⋅ xp
½
lp, hp, xp
subject to:  lp + hp+ txp = 1,   lp ≥  0, hp≥ 0, xp ≥  0, and10
P'⋅ xp = wp⋅ hp.
Solving this problem yields lp*= 1/2, hp*=P'/2(twp+P'), and xp*=wp/2(twp+P').
At equilibrium, as in the free-market case, the total quantity
demanded equals the total quantity supplied: vxp* + (1-v)xr* = Q =
v⋅ wp⋅ hp*+(1-v)⋅ wr⋅ hr*. For a given per-unit wait time t, this condition
establishes the equilibrium price P* in the free-market sector. The wait
time must be such to support our assumption of a fully separating
equilibrium; i.e., wait times cannot be so high that poor individuals would
find it in their interest to shop in the free markets, nor so low as to
induce rich people to shop in the state sector. Since the effective price in
the state sector is twp+P' for poor people and twr+P' for rich people, and
the equilibrium price in the free-market sector is P*, these conditions
imply that:
twp+P' ≤  P*, or t ≤  (P*-P')/wp, and twr+P' ≥  P*, or t ≥  (P*-P')/wr.
The shortest queue time, then, that is still consistent with a fully-
separating equilibrium, is t=(P*-P')/wr. Employing this queue time in the
market-clearing condition vxp* + (1-v)xr* = v⋅ wp⋅ hp*+(1-v)⋅ wr⋅ hr*, allows for
the determination of the equilibrium price, P*. The complexity of the
expression for P* necessitates the use of numerical examples, in section
3, to conduct social welfare comparisons between the price control regime
and the targeted safety net regime.
14 Because the authorities can always
make the price control high enough to be non-binding, resulting in no11
queuing, an optimal price control regime cannot be dominated (in terms
of social welfare) by the no intervention case.
One issue that arises in this setup is the source of the price subsidy.
How will the state be able to sell the consumption good below its cost of
production? Consider the following scenario. The good is produced
exclusively by private firms and the state can tax the free market sales at
the rate of  (P*-1) per unit, while subsidizing the sales at controlled prices
by (1-P') per unit.
15 Under this arrangement, as in the no intervention
case, the producers continue to receive P=1 for each unit of the good. It is
straightforward to show that in equilibrium the state budget will balance:
                v(1-P')xp* = (1-v)(P*-1)xr*, or that vxp* + (1-v)xr* = vP'xp* +
(1-v)P*xr*.
Indeed, because the individual budget constraints yield P'xp* = wphp* and
P*xr* =  wrhr*, the state budget balance expression above is equivalent to
the market-clearing equilibrium condition.
Case 3: Imperfectly Targeted Redistribution
One alternative to state-sector price controls as a social-safety net
is a targeted redistribution plan. The targeting, however, is not perfect, in
the sense that not all of the subsidies go to poor people. We assume that a
poor person cannot appear to be rich; however, a rich person may
incorrectly be viewed as poor (and hence a potential recipient of a12
targeted subsidy). To be specific, the government has available a signal of
reliability γ, 0≤ γ≤ 1, such that the signal indicates that a rich person is
indeed rich with probability γ.
16 A person who is indicated to be rich is
then taxed a lump-sum amount (per period) equal to T. Total tax
collections are (1-v)γT, reflecting the fact that some people who are
actually rich are judged to be poor. The money collected in this fashion is
then redistributed to people who are indicated poor. The transfer to a
person judged to be poor, therefore, is S (for Subsidy) = (1-v)γT/[v+(1-γ)(1-
v)].
The taxes and subsidies will influence an individual's labor supply
and consumption. With homothetic preferences, however, the balanced-
budget lump-sum transfers will not affect the equilibrium price, which
remains at the non-intervention level of P*=1. There are now two "types"
of rich individuals: type r1 (occurring with probability γ) that is correctly
viewed as rich and hence taxed, and type r2 (occurring with probability 1-
γ) that is signaled as being poor, and hence receives a subsidy. The first
type will solve the problem:
 max  Ur1 = lr1
½⋅ xr1
½
 lr1, xr1
subject to:  lr1 + hr1 = 1, lr1 ≥  0, hr1≥ 0, xr1 ≥  0,   and
P⋅ xr1 = wr⋅ hr1 -T.13
Employing P*=1, this problem has interior solution lr1*=(wr-T)/2wr,
hr1*=(wr+T)/2wr, and
xr1*=(wr-T)/2.
The problem for type r2 is identical, except that the budget
constraint is now P⋅ xr2 = wr⋅ hr2 +S, yielding solutions lr2*=(wr+S)/2wr,
hr2*=(wr-S)/2wr, and xr2*=(wr+S)/2. Poor people solve the same problem as
type r2, except that they have the lower wage rate, wp. So,  lp*=(wp+S)/2wp,
hp*=(wp-S)/2wp, and xp*=(wp+S)/2. With a lump-sum tax and subsidy scheme
and the Cobb-Douglas preferences employed here, those who are taxed
increase their labor supply (and hence their contribution to output), while
those who are subsidized work less.
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The utility achieved by type 1 rich individuals is Ur1 = (lr1*)
½⋅ (xr1*)
½ =
(wr-T)/2wr
½, and the utility of type 2 rich individuals is Ur2 = (wr+S)/2wr
½,
or, substituting for S,
Ur2 = (wr+[(1-v)γT/[v+(1-γ)(1-v)]])/2wr
½. The utility achieved by a poor person
is Up = (wp+S)/2wp
½. In the case of a targeted safety net, social welfare is:
W =  [vUp
ε +  (1-v)γUr1
ε + (1-v)(1-γ)Ur2
ε ]
1/ε.
As the size of the tax T increases, two limitations must be taken
into account. The first is that, for T sufficiently large, the constraint that
poor people work a non-negative number of hours becomes binding.
Second, at some point T is so large that the taxed rich are made worse off
than the subsidized poor. In practice, however, the incentive to work14
productively would be undermined by such a severe redistribution
scheme. At such tax rates, those rich who cannot hide their income (i.e.,
who are identifiable as rich) would be expected to pool with the poor in
terms of their productivity: the disincentive to work productively at high
tax rates implies that the marginal product wr would not be sustained by
productive but highly taxed workers. Further, once the taxed rich are no
better off than the subsidized poor, increases in T will increase inequality.
3. Simulations and Analysis
In this section, we explore some of the properties of the model
through a series of numerical and graphical examples. For all of the
examples that are examined, wp is normalized to one.
The first example and the associated graphs involve the following
parameter values:
      ε=-1, implying that the government has some concern about
distribution;
     v=.8, so the majority of individuals are poor;
     wr=11, indicating that rich individuals are much more productive than
poor individuals;
     and, γ=.33, so the signal only correctly identifies one-third of the rich
individuals.15
For Graph 1a, the controlled price in the state sector under the
queuing regime is set arbitrarily at P'=.5. (This is not the optimal
controlled price for the given parameters, though similar results are
obtained when the targeting regime is compared with the optimal price
control. See the discussion below.) Under these circumstances, the
market-clearing price in the free price sector can be determined to be
(approximately) P*=1.45 and the equilibrium queue time is t*=.086. Graph
1a indicates the relative desirability of price controls versus imperfect
targeting, as the size of the tax T under the targeting regime changes. The
vertical axis plots the ratio of social welfare under queuing to social
welfare under targeting, minus one, so that positive values indicate higher
welfare under queuing, and negative values indicate higher welfare under
targeting. In this case, the larger the tax, the more desirable targeting is
relative to queue-rationing, at least until the size of the tax becomes large
relative to the earnings of the rich people. (Recall that as T gets large, the
constraint that poor people work a non-negative number of hours becomes
binding.) The break-even amount of the targeted tax is approximately
5.32: for 5.32<T<10, the targeting regime is preferred to the queuing
regime with controlled price P'=.5. High tax rates, however, are
problematic: in this example, for T>5.96, the welfare of the subsidized
poor exceeds the welfare of the taxed rich. The potential for high-16
productivity workers to mimic the productivity of poor workers suggests
that a tax above 5.96 would not be feasible.
As noted above, similar welfare comparisons arise when the optimal
targeting regime (i.e., the size of the lump-sum tax T is chosen optimally,
in terms of social welfare) is compared with the optimal price-control
regime (i.e., where the level of the price control is chosen optimally.)
Under some circumstances, the optimal targeting regime will dominate,
from the point of view of social welfare, the optimal price control regime,
and under other circumstances, vice versa. The tendency (as in Graph 1a)
is for the optimal targeting regime to set the tax as high as possible,
subject to the constraint that the utility of the taxed rich is no less than
that of the subsidized poor. In not all circumstances, however, do higher
lump-sum taxes produce higher welfare under a targeting regime. If the
proportion of poor people is sufficiently small, the inequality engendered
by the imperfect targeting--some of the ex ante identical rich are
mistakenly subsidized, while the others are taxed--can provide one
rationale for limiting the size of the tax in a targeting regime.
Graph 1b employs the same basic parameters (v=.8, wr=11, γ=.33,
and ε=-1) as in Graph 1a. In this example, however, the size of the tax
under the targeting regime is fixed at its optimal feasible value of T=6.22.
Graph 1b again provides welfare comparisons under the two safety net
alternatives, though for varying values of the controlled price, P'.
18 Note17
that it is not the case that the relative desirability of the queuing regime
decreases monotonically as the controlled price increases. With the
parameter values used in graph 1b, the queuing regime is socially
preferred for .1x<P'<.3y. While all else equal, poor people would prefer to
pay a lower controlled price for their goods, one important factor that is
not constant as P' changes is output. Low controlled prices lead to long
lines, and long lines lead to decreased labor supply and diminished
output. If the output effect is sufficiently strong, social welfare need not
increase as the controlled price falls. Graph 1c indicates the relationship
between total output and the controlled price with the given parameters.
The relative desirability of the optimal queuing and targeting
regimes strongly depends on the four basic parameters of the model, v, wr,
γ, and ε. The role of γ, the reliability of the government's signal about
incomes, is the most straightforward. For any given tax rate (including
the optimal rate) and with ε<1, the benefits of targeting are monotonically
increasing in γ. At the same time, the value of γ does not affect social
welfare under queuing. So, the advantage of an imperfectly targeted social
welfare regime relative to a queuing regime is also monotonically
increasing in γ.
The influence of the other parameters on the relative desirability of
optimal targeting and queuing regimes is less clear cut, and analytical18
methods have not yielded comparative statics results. Nevertheless, both
simulations and intuition are suggestive.
Consider first the influence of the degree of social concern for real
income distribution. Other things being equal, the dead-weight losses and
output declines associated with queuing imply that if the redistributional
motive is weak (ε is close to 1), either the free market or a targeting
regime are preferable to price controls. As the distributional motive
becomes stronger (ε declines), the importance of the redistributive aspects
of queuing rise relative to the dead-weight losses that accompany price
controls. Meanwhile, the problems for social welfare under a targeting
regime caused by imperfect information about real incomes become more
severe. The relative desirability of queuing as compared to targeting can,
therefore, be expected to vary inversely with ε.
Let us now turn to the relationship between the proportion of poor
in the society, v, and the relative social welfare under queuing and
targeting. In the separating equilibria that are examined in the queuing
regime, only the poor choose to queue. Given queue length, then, the
deadweight loss due to queuing declines in v. While equilibrium queue
length is affected by the value of v, our simulations suggest that this
effect is secondary. If this tendency is true in general, then queuing
performs it redistributive function better as the proportion of the poor
falls. Simultaneously, the smaller is v, the larger the perverse19
distributional effect associated with imperfect targeting, that of
mistakenly subsidizing rich people: for a given γ<1, more rich are
subsidized as v declines. Therefore, we expect the relative usefulness of
queuing vis-à-vis targeting to fall as the proportion of the poor rises.
Graph 2a employs the same values for the wage of the rich (wr=11) and for
the reliability of the income signal (γ=.33). It depicts those combinations
of v and ε for which social welfare under the optimal queuing regime
equals social welfare under an optimal (feasible) targeting regime.
Consistent with our intuitive analysis, a larger emphasis on redistribution
and a smaller proportion of poor people tend to favor a queuing regime as
a social safety net.
Finally, consider the difference in the productivity of the rich and
the poor as expressed by the value of wr. (Recall that wp is normalized to
one.) A smaller value of wr implies that the output losses associated with
queuing are more important, because the contribution of poor people to
output is relatively large. This effect reduces the attractiveness of
queuing as a redistribution device. Also, small wr means that the free
market allocation is relatively egalitarian, reducing the role of
distributional concerns. 
Graphs 2b and 2c provide some flavor for how the comparison
among regimes is influenced by changes in the relative productivity of the
rich. In both graphs, the reliability of the government's income signal, γ,20
remains at 0.33, as in the other reported simulations. For Graph 2a, once
again the "redistribution" parameter ε is set equal to 0.2, while the graph
depicts those combinations of v and wr for which social welfare under the
optimal targeting regime equals social welfare under the optimal queuing
regime. Note that higher wr favors the queuing regime, and as in Graph 2a,
a lower proportion of the poor also favors queuing. Graph 2c involves v
fixed at 0.8, and illustrates those combinations of ε and wr for which
social welfare under the optimal targeting regime equals social welfare
under the optimal queuing regime. Once again, a higher wr and a higher ε
(a decreased emphasis on redistribution) make targeting relatively more
attractive.
One generalization that can be offered from these simulations is
that the relative desirability of price controls compared with a targeted
safety net is closely connected to the government's interest in
redistribution, and how well the government can actually tax income. The
dead-weight losses and output falls associated with queuing imply that if
there is no redistributional motive (ε=1), either the free market or a
targeting regime are preferable to price controls. For any level of ε,
effective targeting depends not only on the quality of the signal (γ), but
also on the magnitude of the tax. It may be that high levels of T either
result in adverse work incentives, or they are impossible to enforce: γ
could be a decreasing function of T, and tax revenues may be maximized21
at a relatively low level of T. Under these circumstances, either T or γ will
perforce be low, and targeting will not be an attractive option.
4. Combining Targeting and Price Controls
Rather than being mutually exclusive, explicit taxation and price
controls are used in combination in many transitional countries. Does
such a combination offer an improvement over either or both of the
redistributional regimes employed in isolation?
To address this question within the framework of the model,
consider the following combined scheme. First, the government
implements some (imperfectly) targeted redistribution; then, with their
post-transfer incomes, consumers can purchase the good either on the
free market or, after queuing, at a state-controlled price. The targeting
results in three different types of consumers: the (now subsidized) poor,
the taxed rich, and the (incorrectly) subsidized rich. In a separating
equilibrium, the rich (both types of whom have the same opportunity cost
of time) must not find it in their interest to wait in line with the poor:
once again, we choose the minimum waiting time consistent with
separation.
Simulations reveal that, while generally the imposition of (optimal)
price controls following imperfect targeting is social welfare-improving,
this is not always the case. Because of the dead-weight losses associated22
with queuing, there are at least three situations in which there is no value
to supplementing an imperfect targeting scheme with price controls.
First, as in the case of price controls in isolation, if the government has
little interest in utility redistribution (ε approximately equal to 1), then
the addition of  price controls following targeting offers no social welfare
improvement. Second, if the targeting regime itself is nearly perfect (γ
approximately one), then the optimal distribution can nearly be achieved
with targeting, and there is no gain to supplementing the direct tax and
transfer scheme with a price control that induces a dead-weight loss.
Third, if the productivity difference between workers is very small to
begin with (wp is very close to wr), then again, there is little social loss
from the uneven distribution of utility, and price controls will not be
helpful. But in general, as noted, a welfare program that combines
imperfectly targeted redistribution with state-sector price controls will be
more desirable than either system in isolation, if social welfare is
dependent upon distribution.
5. Conclusions
We have demonstrated the possibility that price controls and state-
sector queue rationing can be preferable to imperfectly-targeted income
subsidies in providing a social-safety net. The advantage of price controls
in targeting subsidies is perhaps greatest in the transitional socialist23
countries, for two reasons. First, these nations have familiarity with the
administration of price controls in state-owned stores. Second, the
measures available for means testing social spending are likely to be very
imprecise, and those most in need of subsidies could change quickly
throughout the reform period. In a sense, our model presented an
optimistic assessment of the ability to target subsidies, in that all truly
poor people were identified as poor by the government. In real-world
safety nets, some needy individuals "fall through the cracks," not
receiving benefits for which they qualify. Taking this possibility into
consideration would add to the relative desirability of price controls.
Nevertheless, there are costs to price controls other than those
included in our model, and these must be considered in formulating
policy. Price controls may be evaded in a variety of ways, from bribes to
government officials to theft of the goods (and diversion to free markets)
by production, retail or transportation employees.
19 It is unlikely that the
rents created by the price controls would then flow to relatively poor
people, i.e., the targeting of the price-control safety net could be
undermined. A similar problem could result within the framework of the
model, if the controlled price does not generate a separating equilibrium,
and some rich people acquire price-controlled goods. Another possibility
is that the opportunity cost of time (which determines the willingness to
wait in line for goods) and overall economic welfare are not highly and24
positively correlated. (In our model, those with the lowest incomes are
also those with the lowest marginal opportunity cost of time.) Again, this
would reduce the relative targeting advantage of state-sector price
controls. With multiple goods, however, the targeting of price controls
can be enhanced by instituting controls only on those goods (generally,
basic consumer commodities) that are intensely consumed by the poor.
A further danger with transitional price controls is that they could
become permanent, remaining in place even after sufficiently reliable
information over economic welfare is available to efficiently implement
Western-style targeted subsidies. Perhaps the largest danger is that the
state-sector price controls could lead to further restraints on private
economic activity. For example, the government might have difficulty
collecting the tax on sales of the good to rich individuals, and hence be
unable to finance the subsidy on sales to the poor. Under these
circumstances, the state might choose to compel producers to supply
some output at low rates, extend price controls to the non-state sector, or
prohibit "exports" of the good to non-price controlled regions. Producers
might then lose money, and the state might respond by expanding
compulsory output quotas, or move to direct state ownership of
production facilities. At the extreme, such a snowballing of controls could
unintentionally re-establish a planned economy.
20 Despite these potential
problems, however, price controls have some desirable features. When the25
alternatives are themselves far from first best, limited price controls and
queue-rationing within the state sector can offer one element of a
serviceable social-safety net.26
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Graph 1a: The ratio of social welfare under queuing to social
welfare under targeting, minus 1, as a function of the tax T.
(wp=1, wr=11, γ =0.33, v=0.8, ε =-1, P’=0.5)29
Graph 1b: The ratio of social welfare under queuing to social
welfare under targeting, minus 1, as a function of the controlled
price P’. (wp=1, wr=11, γ =0.33, v=0.8, ε =-1, T=6.22)30
Graph 1c: Total output (Q) as a function of the controlled price
(P’).
(wp=1, wr=11, γ =0.33, v=0.8, T=6.22, ε =-1.)31
 Graph 2a: Combinations of ε  and v such that social welfare under
queuing (Wq) equals social welfare under targeting (Wt), and the
regions where Wq > Wt and Wt > Wq.
(wp=1, wr=11, γ =0.33)32
Graph 2b: Combinations of v and wr such that social welfare under
queuing (Wq) equals social welfare under targeting (Wt), and the
regions where Wq > Wt and Wt > Wq.
(wp=1, γ =0.33, ε =-1)33
Graph 2c: Combinations of ε  and wr such that social welfare under
queuing (Wq) equals social welfare under targeting (Wt), and the
regions where Wq > Wt and Wt > Wq.
(wp=1, γ =0.33, v=0.8)34
Endnotes
                    
1. Leitzel (1995, p. 26).
2. It was reported in mid-1995, for example, that the average Russian
family received only 40% of its income from wages at officially-reported
jobs. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 132, Part I, 10 July 1995.
3. Sachs (1993, p. 73), notes that the official unemployment rate in
Poland was estimated to overstate actual unemployment by
approximately one-third. Of course, the holding of informal jobs by those
collecting unemployment benefits is not limited to transitional socialist
societies.
4. See, e.g., Atkinson and Micklewright (1992, p. 114).
5. EBRD (1995).
6. On local Russian price controls, see, e.g., the discussion in Berkowitz
(1996).
7. Weitzman (1977) is an early paper that compares a price system with
rationing in meeting a distributional objective, finding that in some
circumstances, rationing is preferred. Prell (1996) extends Weitzman's
analysis to include the alternative of a price control, though without
parallel markets. Other analyses implicitly or explicitly suggest that price
controls can differentially favor rich individuals, in part because they
create rents which better-off individuals might be in a better position to
capture, perhaps corruptly. See, e.g., Bates (1981), Morduch, Brooks, and
Urinson (1994), and Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993).
8. Murrell, Dunn, and Korsun (1996) argue that the culture of
policymaking in transitional societies is another factor that tends to favor
continued price controls.
9. Besley and Coate (1992). Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) presented the
notion that the imposition of "ordeals," such as queuing, can potentially
improve the targeting of a transfer program. In a similar vein, Besley and
Coate (1991) showed how a quality differential between private and public
provision of a (private) good can support redistributional objectives.
10. See Alexeev and Kaganovich (1995) on distributional constraints on
the speed of privatization. Leitzel (1997) contains a fuller discussion of35
                                                                 
substitutes for Western institutions during reform. Berkowitz and DeJong
(1997) look at continuing price controls and the speed of Russian
economic reform.
11. When the social-safety mechanism results in heterogeneity within a
group (of rich or poor, as in case 2 below), each subgroup's utility enters
the social welfare calculation with the appropriate weight.
12. Barzel (1974) indicates two factors that make it likely that the poor
will be those who acquire goods distributed via price controls and
queuing: (1) a high price elasticity of demand and (2) a low income
elasticity. He goes on to suggest that those conditions are likely to be met
in the case of consumer necessities for which close substitutes are
available in free-price, parallel markets.
13. Price controls in socialist societies frequently were accompanied by
strict limits on the amount of a good that a single individual could
purchase once the front of the queue was reached. In the long run, desired
purchases could be large relative to the limit allowed, and waiting time
would be roughly proportional to the quantity purchased. For a
discussion, see Stahl and Alexeev (1986, p. 236). Weitzman (1991)
provides an inventory model that makes the alternative assumption that
waiting time is independent of the quantity purchased.
14. Numerical simulations with equilibrium queue times above the
minimum (but still low enough for a fully separating equilibrium) also
were investigated, with qualitatively similar results. The derivation of the
expression for P* and the simulations were carried out using MAPLE
® V
software.
15. Alternatively, it could be assumed that the state produces the entire
output of the good at the same cost as in the no intervention case, selling
some of the output at a low fixed price and the rest at a free market price.
A combination of state and private production is another possibility. In
the economies in transition, taxing the sales and profits of a relatively
few producers may be considerably easier and politically more acceptable
than taxing the incomes of a large number of individuals. In Russia, for
example, individual income tax collections (2.2% of GDP in 1995) have
been dwarfed by the total amount collected from the enterprise profits
tax, VAT, and excise taxes (14.3% of GDP in 1995). Russian Economic
Trends, p. 17.
16. Alternatively, it could be assumed that poor people also will be mis-
categorized occasionally as being rich. Such an alteration would increase36
                                                                 
the attractiveness of price controls relative to targeting.
17. If instead of a lump-sum tax, workers are taxed a percentage of their
earnings, then the taxed individuals no longer increase their labor supply.
Simulations conducted using a proportional tax scheme produced results
similar in qualitative terms to those reported in section 3 using lump-sum
taxes.
18. The qualitative properties displayed in graphs 1a and 1b are
reproduced if it is the comparative utility of only the poor people--as
opposed to total social welfare--under the two regimes that is examined.
19. Leitzel (1998) examines the distributional impact of price
liberalization when price-controlled goods are diverted from the state to
the private sector. Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993) also look at the
effects of rent-seeking in the presence of price controls.
20. There is some evidence that such a snowballing of controls led to the
Soviet planned economy in the first instance. See the discussion and
references in Leitzel (1995, pp. 6-7).